The Logic of the Potential Threat

The painting above depicts the scene of the surrender of Vercingetorix, the famed leader of the tribes of Gaul, to Julius Caesar, who would go on to become dictator of Rome. Julius Caesar, having started a civil war by crossing the Rubicon, then becoming dictator (a one year term sometimes given to an individual in times of crisis), then dictator for life (unprecedented in Roman history), virtually brought about the end of the Roman Republic and the begining of the Roman Empire.

But todays blog isn't about the fall of the Roman Republic, nor is it about Julius Caesar, it is about history itself...and how it is often repeated.

I would like to quote a passage from a book called Rubicon by the historian Tom Holland. He is discussing the mindset of the Republic after having undergone a long and costly war with its' great rival Carthage. This war almost saw the end of Rome as a world power and there was a determnation that this would never happen again.

"Never again would they tolerate the existence of a power capable of threatening their own survival. Rather than risk that, they felt themselves perfectly justified in launching a pre-emptive strike against any opponent who appeared to be growing too uppity. Such opponents were easy - all too easy - to find."

Remind you of anyone?

For more serious opposition to the Republic, Holland has this to say about the Greeks:

" ..in the early years of of their encounters with Rome, the Republic did not behave at all in the manner of a conventional imperial power. Like lightening from a clear sky, the legions would strike with devastating impact, and then, just as abruptly, be gone. For all the fury of these irregular interventions, they would be punctuated by lengthy periods when Rome appeared to have lost interest in Greek affairs altogether. Even when she did intervene, her incursions across the Adriatic continued to be represented as peace-keeping ventures. These still had as their object not the annexation of territory but the clear establishment of the Republic's prestige, and the slapping down of any overweening power."

This whole attitude to countries that do not fall into line with the policies of, or concede the superiority of, the self-appointed superpower, seems to be present in much of today's foreign policy. It would also appear to be reponsible for much of the animosity, if not hatred, that is felt for the superpower by those countries that find themselves threatened by those policies.

It is plain that, historically, the internal politics of any nation has been of no real interest to the Americans or the British, except in terms of how those politics effect their own interests..such as the continued flow of oil and other valuable resources to the superpower, the sale of products, including armaments manfuctured and sold by the Americans and the British, or the strategic geography of any given nation as it concerns matters of global political or military import.

The whole war in Iraq is based on a potential threat logic: That to strike out at potential threats is somehow justified...even if those threats are later proven to be without creedance, or even if those threats were manufatured by opponents to the regime, internal as well as external, at the receiving end of the military strike.

On a more basic level the logic of the potential threat is one that is often used in cases of atrocities committed during combat. One of the excuses given by war criminals, when explaining their killing of children and infants, is that those children will one day be grown and become enemies. This excuse was used after the massacre of Native Americans at Sand Creek, and it was used by Lt. William Calley after the massacres at Mi Lai. It has also been voiced by countless defendants from the Balkans to the Nuremburg trials of the Nazis. It simply does not wash. It is no excuse...at any level.

Potential threats: Do unto others before they do unto you...or even if you just think they might...maybe..go ahead...it's OK.....George says so.